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Abstract
*
The storage capacity of natural gas containing hydrogen sulfide is large and widely distributed. Release of hydrogen 
sulfide-bearing natural gas from the pipelines imposes serious threats to the lives and property near the leakage
source. Based on a large number of accident statistics and analysis and experiment results, a new risk analysis method 
for hydrogen sulfide poisoning is proposed, which takes into account of the probability of risk, the scope of damage
and dose-response model. A suitable leakage source model is established, and according to the leakage scenario, 
Gaussian plume model is chosen to estimate the diffusion extent of well blowout of natural gas containing sulfide
hydrogen. Three leakage scenarios of Sichuan-Eastern Gas Transportation Project are analyzed based on the 
historical data of European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group and BG Transco, including individual risk analysis and 
societal risk analysis. The corresponding social risk curves are plotted and hazardous areas based on different hole 
diameters are classified. Societal risk varies significantly with the factors such as population density, probability of 
death and so on. With the acceptable risk criteria published by HSE taken into account, individual risk and societal 
risk of the leakage scenarios in this paper are found all unacceptable. The proposed method can provide supports for 
the safety management and maintenance of natural gas pipeline as well as evacuation after accidents happen.
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1. Introduction 
Natural gas containing hydrogen sulfide is an important part of gas resource in China. The early 1980s, 
China's proven natural gas containing hydrogen sulfide accounted for 1/4 of total gas reserves, mainly in 
the Ordos, Bohai Bay Basin and Sichuan Basin, and 80% of which distributed in the West and Southwest
[1]. The gas with over 2 % H2S is usually defined as a high H2S gas. Before 2004, China focused on the 
exploitation of no H2S gas or low H2S gas field. With the gradual development of China’s gas industry 
infrastructure, the demand and consumption of natural gas appear striking growth (shown in Figure 1). 
The highly rely on oil and gas resources makes people turn their attention to high H2S gas field which is 
high-risk and difficult to exploit, but the following security problems bring concerns to people.
*Statistics data from the Fourth Asia Gas Summit and the National Bureau of Statistics
Fig. 1. The growth trends of China’s natural gas consumption and production
Because of high toxic and corrosive, hydrogen sulfide can cause drill broken down and corrosion of oil 
and gas pipeline, which imposes a serious threat to each process of drilling, well completion, perforating, 
gas test, exploiting, transportation and so on [3]. Taking the example of the artery of energy - Sichuan-
East natural gas transmission project, its origin is Sichuan Basin, in which high H2S gas is most widely 
distributed in China. The project covers Sichuan, Chongqing, Hubei, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
and Shanghai, and the transmission capacity is designed to be 120 billion cubic meters a year, to be 
equivalent to 1/7 of China’s natural gas consumption in 2009[4]. Once the pipeline was out of control and 
a leakage happened, hydrogen sulfide will eventually settle to the ground in the dispersion process due to 
its higher density than air, and it will cause hydrogen sulfide poisoning to the surrounding residents. It is 
likely to initiate fire or explosion if an ignition source exists, even leading to severe damage of social 
production and national economy, human deaths, and serious environment pollution, as well as 
widespread social panic. The social stability will be directly affected.
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Recently, a number of leakage accidents of hydrogen sulfide-bearing natural gas have happened in 
China, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. The leakage accidents and its consequence of hydrogen sulfide-bearing natural gas between 1992 and 2011
Time Address Institution Consequence
1992.9.28
The Zhao 48# well 
700meters away from the 
north of Song town, Gezi 
village, Zhao county, 
Hebei province
20th team of underpit 
operation corporation, 
Petroleum Administration
Bureau of North China
Causing 6 residents surrounded killed and 24 
people poisoned
2003.12.23
The 16# gas well of 
Northeast Gas Field in 
Gaoqiao town, Kai Xian,
Chongqing
China National Petroleum 
Corporation
243 people died from poisoning, 2142 people 
hospitalized and 65000 people were 
evacuated in this accident. Direct economic 
losses are amounted to 6400 million yuan [5].
2006.3.25 The Luo 2# well of Sichuan 
Oil & Gas fields
China National Petroleum 
Corporation
About 10000 people surrounded were 
evacuated
As the leakage and dispersion are the root causes of hydrogen sulfide-bearing natural gas pipeline 
accidents, thus a reasonable leakage and dispersion model can help to predict danger zone formed by the 
gas dispersion along the surface, grasp the diffusion tendency of hazardous substances, and then reduce 
the damage caused by the accident. These can provide support for the decision of security management 
and emergency response and have a great significance for the quantitative risk analysis of gas pipeline.
The author has established a suitable leakage and dispersion model in another paper [6], and the risk 
analysis method wasn’t elaborated owing to limited space, which is only applicable to the analysis of jet 
fire radiation. Based on the previous paper, a new risk analysis method for the toxic effects of hydrogen 
sulfide-bearing natural gas is proposed in this paper, and the corresponding societal risk curve is drawn. 
Referring to the acceptable risk criteria of United Kingdom, the results of risk analysis are ranked too.
2. Accident scenario
High pressure natural gas leaked into the atmosphere in a row from the pipeline in a place. The 
leakage occurred in July, 12:00, and it’s showed in Figure 2. Summarized in Table 2 are the relevant 
physical parameters. The diameter of gas pipeline is 1200mm and the diameter of hole is d1=60mm, 
d2=600mm, d3=1200mm respectively.
                      Smoke plume
                 
                     Hr                  
                                         Ground
       0                    x             
Location of gas leakage：Leakage pressure P0
Wind 
speed
3m/s
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of natural gas leakage
Table 2. Physical parameters
Parameters Values
Operating pressure P/ MPa 12
Gas temperature Ts/ K 298.15
Methane density ρ0/( kg/m2) 78.0
Wind speed v/(m/s) 3
Atmospheric temperature Ta/ K 288.15
For such leakage accident, the initial momentum and buoyancy of the leaked gas should be taken into 
consideration. The author has established a suitable leakage and dispersion model in previous paper [6], 
and the relevant parameters of leakage source are shown in Table 3:
Table 3. Maximum gas flow rates based on different hole diameters
Hole diameter d1 d2 d3
Hole size A/(m2) 0.0028 0.2826 1.1304
Maximum gas release rate chokedmQ )( /(
1−⋅ skg ) 58.32 5832.12 23326.56
Flow rate su /(m/s) 267.03 264.58 264.56
Elevated height after correction irH , /m 9.17 94.56 195.67
The chemical hazards caused by leakage of natural gas with 9.02% hydrogen sulfide are analyzed in 
this paper. The proposed procedure concerns a sample pipeline, which covers 1.8m depth, passing 
through a town area at L=20 km from the gas supply station. The area is 9 km×9 km wide and populated
by ρP=403 persons/km
2. The individual risk is estimated at the location of 1000m apart from the pipeline 
and the societal risk of a 9 km×9 km wide residential area is estimated. 
3. Individual risk analysis
The probability of death from an accident can be estimated as the following equation [7]:
∫
−
∞−
−
=
5
2
2
2
1 rP
s
dseP
π
                                                                   (1)
where Pr expresses the fatality of a person from poisoning of H2S and can be estimated as the following 
equation:
)ln(Pr 21 TCkk
n ⋅+=                                                                   (2)
where k1、k2、n depend on chemical properties and is -31.42, 3.008 and 1.43 respectively [9]. Referring 
to the process of Kai Xian “12.23” accident, exposure time T=25 min [10].
1882  Zhang Jianwen et al. / Procedia Engineering 26 (2011) 1878 – 1890Zhang Jianwe  et al/ Procedia Engineeri g 00 (2011) 00–000 5
The leaked high-pressure hydrogen sulfide-bearing natural gas contains the main component of light 
gas CH4 and little heavy gas H2S. As the molecular weight of H2S is 34 and the average molecular weight
of air is 29, the mixture gas can be treated as neutral gas [11]. Considering Gaussian dispersion model has 
the characteristic of clear physical picture, easy to solve, adequate test data and the calculated results can 
be in good agreement with the experimental data, it’s chosen to estimate the concentration of hydrogen 
sulfide at the ground level. By assuming the mass fraction of hydrogen sulfide in natural gas is ω=16.2%, 
the concentration of hydrogen sulfide at the receptor positioncaused by different leakage source along the 
pipeline is given as below:
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where the unit of C is ppm. mQ is the maximum release rate and Hr is the elevated height which can be 
obtained from Table 2. Assuming that the pipeline passes the central area of town which is defined as the 
origin of coordinate, wind flow along the x-axis, y is the cross-wind distance, and the vertical height z=0. 
As the level of atmospheric stability is B in such leakage scenario, the coefficient of diffusion can be 
expressed as follows [8]:
2/1)0001.01(16.0 −+= xxyσ ， xz 12.0=σ .
The death rate at the receptor position caused by different leakage source along the pipeline can be 
estimated by using Eq. (1) ~ (3) and it’s drawn in Figure 3:
Fig. 3. Contour of death rate associated with hole size along the sample pipeline
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As shown in Figure 3, almost no chemical hazard is imposed to the resident at the receptor positionby 
the leakage accident when hole diameter d1=60mm. For the scenario of hole diameter d2=600mm and 
d3=1200mm, the pipeline is divided into three zones, namely the zone where leakage happen leads to the 
fatality within the range from 1%—50%, 50%—99%, 99%—100% respectively. The pipe length of each 
zone can be obtained from Figure 3, and the average lethality of each zone can be calculated by the 
following formula:
1
49.237
0
49.237
0
10099, ≈=
∫
∫
−
dy
Pdy
Pi                                                                    (4)
840.0
67.285
49.237
67.285
49.237
9950, ≈=
∫
∫
−
dy
Pdy
Pi                                                       (5)
178.0
84.326
67.285
84.326
67.285
501, ≈=
∫
∫
−
dy
Pdy
Pi                                                          (6)
The fatal length iFLL , is the area enclosed by P-y curve and y-axis and can be calculated by equation 
(7). The results are summarized in Table 4:
10099,9950,501,
0 10099,10099,9950,9950,501,501,,
840.0178.0 −−−
−−−−−−
++≈
++== ∫
iii
L
iiiiiiiiFL
lll
lPlPlPdLPL
                      (7)
Table 4. Summary of the results of fatal length
d1=60mm d2=600mm d3=1200mm
501, −il /m 0 82.34 75.68
9950, −il /m 0 96.36 86.16
10099, −il /m 0 474.98 542.2
iFLL , /m 0 570.58 628.05
For the analysis of individual risk, the data of failure frequencies based on failure causes is needed. As 
the lack of detailed statistical information of domestic natural gas pipeline, the historical data of the 
European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) is referred in this paper, as shown in Table 5:
Table 5 Statistical data of the European gas pipeline incidents [12]
Failure causes Failure frequency iϕ /(
11 −− ⋅akm ) Percentage of totalfailure rate (%)
Percentage of different hole size (%)
Small Medium Great
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External interference 3.00×10-4 51 25 56 19
Construction defects 1.10×10-4 19 69 25 6
Corrosion 8.10×10-5 14 97 3 <1
Ground movement 3.60×10-5 6 29 31 40
Others/unknown 5.40×10-5 10 74 25 <1
Total failure rate 5.81×10-4 100 48 39 13
The hole sizes are defined as follows: small hole, hole size is lower than 2 cm; medium hole, hole size ranges from 2 cm up to the 
pipe diameter; great hole, full bore rupture or hole size is greater than the pipe diameter.
As shown in Table 5, the external interference by third party activity is the leading cause of major 
accidents related to medium or great holes. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the external interference in 
more detail. It is known that the extent of damage caused by third party activity depends on several 
factors, such as pipe diameter, depth of cover, wall thickness, population density and prevention method.
Therefore, The failure rate caused by third party activity [13] is given by:
PMPDWTDCdEIiEIi KKKK,,, ϕϕ =                                                      (8)
where dEIi ,,ϕ is the failure rate varying with pipe diameter and can be calculated by equation (9), (10), 
(11):
                      18562.218.4,, 001.0
−−= ddEIsmall eϕ                                                      (9)
                        02841.212.4,, 001.0
−−= ddEImedium eϕ                                                   (10)
                        13441.205.4,, 001.0
−−= ddEIgreat eϕ                                                      (11)
where DCK ， WTK ， PDK ， PMK are the correction factors of depth of cover, wall thickness, population
density and prevention method and values 0.54, 1, 3.16, 0.91 respectively according to Table 6.
Table 6. Correction values of failure frequencies caused by third party activity [13]
Factors
Conditions Correction value
Depth of cover
dc<0.91m 2.54
0.91m≤dc≤1.22m 0.78
dc>1.22m 0.54
Wall thickness
t = tmin or d>0.9m 1
6.4mm<t≤7.9mm and 0.15m<d≤0.45m 0.4
t > tmin 0.2
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Population density
Town 18.77
Suburban 3.16
Rural 0.81
Prevention methods
Marker posts only 1.03
All other methods 0.91
dc: depth of cover; t: wall thickness of pipeline; d: diameter of pipeline; rural: a population density not exceeding 2.5 persons/ha; 
town: central areas of towns or cities; suburban: area intermediate in character between rural and town; tmin: minimum wall thickness.
Failure frequencies based on other failure causes can be obtained from Table 4, and the total failure 
frequency associated with hole size is calculated by adding failure frequency based on each failure cause. 
The results are shown in Table 7:
Table 7 Failure frequencies of pipeline estimated with EGIG and BG Transco data
Failure causes
Failure frequency of different hole size (1/year·km)
   Small Medium Great
External interference
1.16×10-6 1.46×10-6 1.42×10-6
Construction defects
7.59×10-5 2.75×10-5 6.6×10-6
Corrosion
7.86×10-5 2.43×10-6 8.1×10-7
Ground movement
1.04×10-5 1.12×10-5 1.44×10-5
Others/unknown
4.00×10-5 1.35×10-5 5.4×10-7
Total failure rate
2.06×10-4 5.61×10-5 2.38×10-5
Therefore, when the hole diameter is 60mm, 600mm, 1200mm, the corresponding failure rate is 
5.61×10-5, 5.61×10-5, 2.38×10-5(1/year·km) respectively. Assuming the constant failure rate along the 
pipeline, the individual risk [7] can be estimated as:
aper
LdLPIR ii iFLii
L
i
/1070.4
1038.210628.051061.510570.581061.50
5
53535
,0
−
−−−−−
×=
×××+×××+××=
== ∑∑ ∫ ϕϕ
          
(12)
Recently, the criteria of acceptable risk level in China have been proposed preliminarily, but it needs a 
further revised and improvement, while relatively sophisticated criteria of individual risk and societal risk 
have been established in other countries. So the individual risk criteria of British is chosen, including the 
maximum acceptable level of individual risk 10-4 per/a and the negligible level of individual risk 10-6
per/a. After evaluating, the individual risk calculated is acceptable but passes the negligible level. 
Therefore, safety management of natural gas pipeline should be strengthened to minimize the failure rate, 
while emergency measures should be adopted for the crowd there.
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4. Societal risk analysis
The concentration of H2S C based on different death rate P can be calculated by the formula (1), (2), 
the results are shown in Table 7:
Table 8. Death rate associated with H2S concentration
P
0.01 0.50 0.99
C/ppm
291.2817 500.6814 860.6165
Contour line of concentration based on different death rate can be drawn by quoting equation (3) and 
Table 8. As shown in Figure 4, 5, 6:
Fig. 4. Contour map of concentration when the hole diameter d1=60mm
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Fig. 5. Contour map of concentration when the hole diameter d2=600mm
Fig. 6. Contour map of concentration when the hole diameter d3=1200mm
The number of deaths in each region can be calculated by equation (13), (14), (15) [7]:
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501,501,501,501,501,
501,
−−−−− == ∫
−
iiPiiA Pi
PAdAPN
i
ρρ                                   (13)
9950,9950,9950,9950,9950,
9950,
−−−−− == ∫
−
iiPiiA Pi
PAdAPN
i
ρρ                           (14)
10099,10099,10099,10099, 10099,
10099,
−−−− == −
−
∫ iiPiA Pi PAdAPN i
i
ρρ
        
              (15)
where 501, −iA ， 9950, −iA ， 10099, −iA express the area where the death rate range from 1%—50%，50%—
99%，99%—100% respectively and can be obtained from Figure 4, 5, 6.
The total number of deaths can be estimated as the following equation:
10099,9950,501, −−− ++= iiii NNNN                                                      (16)
The results are summarized in Table 9:
Table 9. Summary of the results of deaths
d1=60mm d2=600mm d3=1200mm
501, −iA /m
2
10834.04 1138827.19 930413.49
9950, −iA /m
2
6265.36 652507.42 1331187.35
10099, −iA /m
2
6985.58 713098 2905016.61
501, −iN /per 1 117 96
9950, −iN /per 2 199 400
10099, −iN /per 3 287 1171
iN /per 6 603 1667
Cumulative failure rate [7]:
∑∑ ∫ ≥=≥= i iiCFLiii
L
i NNLdLNNuF )()( ,0
ϕϕ                                     (17)
where cumulative fatal length, )(, NNL iiCFL ≥ = ∫ ≥
L
i dLNNu0
)( , means a length within which an 
accident leads to N or more fatalities. )( NNu i ≥ is the unit function which is unity (1) if the argument is 
true or zero otherwise.
The corresponding societal risk curve can be drawn by quoting equation (17), as shown in Figure 7:
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Fig.7. Societal risk caused by chemical poisoning of hydrogen sulfide-bearing natural gas
In view of the criteria of acceptable risk level in China hasn’t been widely accepted yet, the acceptable 
risk criteria published by HSE [14]. As shown in Figure 7, the result exceeds the acceptable range, 
indicating that leakage of hydrogen sulfide can cause serious public safety problem.
5. Conclusions
• A quantitative risk assessment for hydrogen sulfide poisoning is proposed;
• According to the results of assessment, hydrogen sulfide poisoning have serious effects on individuals 
and communities;
• Hazardous areas based on different diameters of leakage hole are classified;
• The place of hazardous zone vary with the hole diameter, and the size of hazardous zone is in positive 
correlation with hole diameter;
• The proposed method can provide support for the planning and construction of new pipelines, the 
adjustment of existing pipelines, safety production and security management.
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